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and pungent, that we have little hesitation in pronouncing it the best part of the book. The survey of the awakening intellectual life of Scotland is excellent, and even the prosaic record of industrial development is turned to literary account.

To say much by way of adverse criticism in a review of this length would be both thankless and unfair. Occasionally perhaps, but certainly seldom, the writer's mass of facts gets the better of him, and if he had written a longer book, he would be less the victim of his own industry. For example, on page 229 he speaks as if Whitefield's influence were alone responsible for the Cambuslang "wark", whereas McCulloch, Bowman, More, and others had the revival in full swing before Whitefield appeared on the scene at all. This, doubtless, is the result of the need of undue condensation—and on the whole the book is a continuous triumph of clear thinking and clear style over a mass of material which might have been an impossible burden for one less skilful than Mr. Mathieson.

Speaking of the author's first book, the *Scotsman* said, "Mr. Mathieson makes his first appearance as a Scottish historian, and in this singularly able work he steps at once into the front rank". One might say of the present volume that it fully entitles him to retain the place he has won for himself among the writers of Scottish history. Those who know the able work done by the late Mr. Henry Grey Graham upon the same period of the country's history will find little difficulty in ranking Mr. Mathieson alongside of him.

JOHN DALL.

A History of the British Army. By the Hon. J. W. FORTESCUE. Vol. V., 1803-1807; Vol. VI., 1807-1809. (London and New York: Macmillan and Company. 1910. Pp. xxi, 437; xix, 448.)

THE high quality of Mr. Fortescue's *History of the British Army* is well maintained in the two volumes lately published, although they deal with a dreary period during which a few great deeds and noteworthy achievements were more than set off by serious failures and extraordinary incapacity in the cabinet and in the field. He is a laborious and tireless student and besides a multitude of printed authorities has searched the files of unpublished correspondence in the Public Record Office to good purpose.

In the Mahratta war of 1803-1805, the British forces were indeed fortunate in possessing two commanders endowed with such ability, energy, and unwavering determination to succeed as Arthur Wellesley and Gerard Lake. Their methods of achieving success were, however, essentially different. Lake risked much and trusted to his driving power and the dogged courage and endurance of his troops to pull him through. At Laswarree, Delhi, Furruckabad, and Deig, he was signally favored by fortune and all went well, but the mishaps of Monson's column and the repeated bloody repulses of his assaults on Bhurpore were directly due

to impatience and want of forethought. On the other hand, although Assaye was certainly won by the narrowest margin, beneath it lay "a solid structure of communications thoroughly guarded, magazines and advanced bases carefully stored, transport laboriously organized; everything provided that prudence and sagacity could foresee, nothing left to chance which could be assured by industry and care". As Mr. Fortescue aptly remarks, "Lake's system might suffice for one man; Wellesley's gave a chance of success to any man". Still Lake was undeniably a fine, indomitable soldier, the inspiration of whose leadership impelled his men to march and fight beyond the limits of ordinary endurance.

Mr. Fortescue constantly strives to seek the causes that led to victory or defeat, and it might seem that he has occasionally given too much space to a minor campaign such as the half-forgotten war with the King of Kandy in 1803, were it not, as he states, that "it may serve as a warning of the mischief that may be done by a foolish Governor seconded by a foolish General".

In the dismal history of those years, folly in the conduct of military operations predominates. The Ministry of All the Talents seldom let slip an opportunity of displacing a competent by an incapable commander and hampering all with absurd instructions. One officer was put in command of a force of less than five thousand men with which he was directed to conquer the province of Chile and establish a chain of posts across the Andes to Buenos Ayres, a distance of nine hundred miles as the crow flies, which is justly characterized as "one of the most astonishing plans that ever emanated from the brain even of a British Minister of War". Sir John Moore, a very capable commander, on the other hand, was virtually told, "Take ten thousand troops to Sweden and do something. We do not know what you can do, nor have we any reason for giving you ten thousand instead of thirty thousand men, except that we are not disposed to risk the loss of more". The troops were not permitted to land and were retained on board the transports for three months when they were ordered back to England. It is scarcely surprising that some of Moore's friends declared that the expedition was a trick devised by the ministers to get rid of their ablest general, though it can no longer be doubted that it was undertaken in good faith but with amazing lack of judgment.

The waywardness and ineptitude of Sir John Stuart and Sir Sidney Smith, both men of courage and some ability but inordinate vanity, to whom the command of the combined military and naval operations in the Mediterranean in 1806 was unluckily entrusted, are vividly described. The mismanagement of this expedition was barely surpassed by that of another to South America conducted by Sir Home Popham and General Whitelocke during the following year. The battle of Maida was, however, highly creditable to the troops engaged. Five thousand two hundred British soldiers encountered six thousand four

hundred French in the open field without any distinct advantage in position or circumstances and inflicted upon them a crushing defeat in which their loss was remarkably severe and that of the British almost incredibly light. The British infantry formed in a shallow but broad line met the onset of a narrow but deep French column that was dashed against it, with an irresistible storm of bullets in front and flanks. The assailants were soon thrown into irretrievable disorder and more men fell in the retreat than in the advance. It was a signal triumph of fire-action over shock-action, won by cool and steady marksmanship. Whatever profit might have been derived from following it up was thrown away by Stuart and Smith, except the useful experience in fighting the French acquired by the troops and such subordinate leaders as Cole, Kempt, Oswald, and Ross, all of whom subsequently earned distinction in the campaigns of the Peninsula.

Mr. Fortescue has visited the scenes of the Vimeiro campaign and his description of the battles has gained color and accuracy from his personal knowledge of the ground on which they were fought. Such an inspection of the battlefield would seem as indispensable to the military historian as the study of contemporary records. At Roliça the French were greatly, and at Vimeiro considerably, outnumbered and in the latter action Junot used his troops badly by wasting their efforts in a series of disconnected attacks which were met and repelled by superior numbers. The fruits of victory were lost by the failure to follow it up due to the caution and indecision of Burrard and Dalrymple.

Napier's and Oman's accounts of Moore's campaign have been carefully compared with the Spanish histories of Arteche and Toreno and Commandant Balagny's *Campagne de l'Empereur Napoléon en Espagne*, recently published under the auspices of the Historical Section of the French General Staff, which contains much material that was inaccessible to former writers. Moore's conduct of the retreat is vigorously defended, although no attempt is made to conceal or minimize the heavy losses sustained in men and stores. The oft-debated question whether any military or political advantage was gained by Moore's raid on Napoleon's communications is temperately reviewed. At the time, the entire campaign seemed a dreary tale of disaster relieved only by two or three brilliant cavalry actions and the sharp repulse of an ill-directed reconnaissance in force undertaken by Marshal Soult just before the embarkation at Coruña. Mr. Fortescue is convinced that "Moore's operations produced very considerable results; and it is no exaggeration to say that they changed the whole course of history". Possibly with more reason he regards Moore as the very best trainer of troops ever possessed by Britain, and points out that his system rested on the single principle that each and every officer should be required to know and perform his duty and to teach his men their duty also. "No man", he concludes, "not Cromwell, nor Marlborough, nor Wellington, has set so strong a mark for good upon the British Army as John Moore".

An adequate index to this installment of the work is provided at the

end of the sixth volume and there are twenty-six maps and plans. Those relating to the actions at Maida, Vimeiro, and Coruña deserve special mention.

E. A. CRUIKSHANK.

Geschichte der Russischen Revolution. Von LUDWIG KULCZYCKI. Einzig autorisierte Übersetzung aus dem Polnischen von ANNA SCHAPIROE-NEURATH. Band I. *Von den Dekabristen bis zu dem Versuch, die Agitation ins Volk zu tragen (1825 bis 1870).* (Gotha: Friedrich Andreas Perthes. 1910. Pp. xx, 520.)

ALTHOUGH in the last few years much has been written about the Russian revolution, we are still doubtless only at the beginning of the literature on this subject. The immediate political turmoil, however, has in great measure subsided, and even if the lull be but momentary the historian is in less danger than he was a little while ago of having his clearness of vision obscured by the dust of battle. The time has come therefore when we may hope for careful scholarly works, not only in Russian but in western languages, that shall give us thoughtful and, as far as possible, unprejudiced accounts of the whole movement. Fortunately we have good promise of such a work from the pen of Professor Kulczycki, of Lemberg, whose first volume has just appeared in a German translation from the Polish. He has studied his topic for some twenty years and he has known personally several of the Russian revolutionists. His sympathies are indeed obvious, but so far, at least, he has written with singular dispassionateness, seldom if ever allowing himself to be carried away by his liberal sentiments or by his national patriotism as a Pole.

After an introduction of about one hundred pages, the author devotes the rest of his first volume to the period of Russian history between 1825 and 1870. In two succeeding volumes he will bring down the narrative to September 30, 1905. His tale of recent events may be expected to prove more interesting to most readers than the part we have before us. It will not necessarily be more valuable, for what he already offers is no mere preface but a systematic account of the earlier stages of a great movement. Even if they long seemed barren of permanent result, a knowledge of them is indispensable to any one who wishes to comprehend fully the later history.

Up to the time of the conspiracy which culminated in the rising of the Decabrists in 1825, we may say that in Russia liberal criticism and discontent showed itself in mere isolated mutterings. Since then a revolutionary party has existed, albeit nearly stamped out of existence at the start and for long years small and impotent. Professor Kulczycki's account of the December rising confirms the usually received opinion that the conspirators, most of them men of high character, were hopelessly visionary, not to say incompetent. Accident offered them an extraordinary chance of temporary success in their wild enterprise but